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Abstract

'Reason' is not one of Wittgenstein's usual words (this is pointed out by more than one of the contributors to
Wittgenstein and Reason). Despite this, his insights into the nature of rule-following, the basis of religious
belief and our capacity to understand and interpret both the mundane and ritualistic practices of others sheds
important light on what we might possibly mean by talk of what is reasonable and rational. This is clearly
brought out, in different ways and contexts, by the various contributors to this collection. Each chapter of the
volume offers a tightly argued, beautifully written and illuminating take on these issues.
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Wittgenstein and Reason

John Preston (ed.), Wittgenstein and Reason, Blackwell, 2008, 149pp., $34.95 (pbk),
ISBN 9781405180955.
Reviewed by Daniel D. Hutto, University of Hertfordshire

'Reason' is not one of Wittgenstein's usual words (this is pointed out by more than one of the
contributors to Wittgenstein and Reason). Despite this, his insights into the nature of rule-following,
the basis of religious belief and our capacity to understand and interpret both the mundane and
ritualistic practices of others sheds important light on what we might possibly mean by talk of what is
reasonable and rational. This is clearly brought out, in different ways and contexts, by the various
contributors to this collection. Each chapter of the volume offers a tightly argued, beautifully written
and illuminating take on these issues.
Jacques Bouveresse's contribution consists of a paper from 2000, re-printed and translated from
French for the first time especially for this collection. It explores, in detail, Wittgenstein's critique of
Frazer's approach to understanding ritual practices, such as those involving the famously sinister
activity of human sacrifice, as practiced by the shores of Lake Nemi in ancient times. Special attention
is given to Frazer's tendency to misconstrue the point of engaging in such practices by treating them
as poorly conceived attempts to bring about certain results by causal means. If Frazer's view were
correct, this would not only reflect a kind of basic human proto-scientific attitude to the world, but one
that happened to have been very poorly grounded. Essentially, if this were the point of practice then
we would be right to regard it as a sort of hopeless and superstitiously corrupt attempt at scientific
control. But, Bouveresse observes, it was precisely this type of mischaracterization of our basic human
activities and tendencies against which Wittgenstein chiefly wished most to guard. By way of contrast,
he proposed that we can only begin to grasp the point or enter into the spirit of ritual practices, and
thus make them intelligible, by first noting their expressive, symbolic character and seeing how these
relate to our own tendencies for engaging in relevantly similar behaviour. Therefore, without denying
the possibility or potential value of providing actual, accurate historical explanations of the genesis of
specific rituals, the kind of understanding that Wittgenstein thought was required was of a wholly
different sort. It is the kind of understanding that can only be engendered by our making comparisons
with such practices and our own basic and everyday inclinations for non-instrumental, ritual activity
(e.g. the shaking of hands, kissing foreheads). By seeing that there is a sort of formal connection
between what we do and real and imagined examples of such activities, it is possible to recognize that
'This is simply the way human beings live, or act, or react'. This is a paradigm of a philosophical

revelation.
Distinguishing conceptual relativism into its alethic and ontological forms, Hans-Johann Glock makes a
sophisticated case for its possibility (but not its truth per se). He identifies the kind of conceptual
relativism (CR) of interest (one that he finds in Wittgenstein, see p. 25) as the logical product of two
claims: that concepts are not given to us by the world or experience in a fixed way and that there is,
ultimately, no neutral framework for assessing the truth or rationality of adopting one set of concepts
over another. His paper provides a compelling defense of the possibility of CR by de-stabilizing the
core of Davidson's famous argument based on the impossibility of imagining a language (and hence
conceptual scheme) that is, in principle, not susceptible to translation or interpretation. Many take that
argument to have decisively dispatched the idea that there might be radically different conceptual
schemes. Glock works to rescue the situation by laying bare the bones of Davidson's argument to
reveal that it encounters a dilemma. One or other of its central premises has to go. Thus, on Glock's
rendering, at one step the argument requires that we accept the possibility of alternative conceptual
schemes and implies the possibility of untranslatable languages. But it is cogently shown that if the
notion of 'untranslatability' indicates something very strong, such as inexplicability or ineffability, then
we have no reason to accept this premise as true. And Glock goes on to argue that the weaker -- and
much more plausible -- claim, which takes failure of translation to indicate something along the lines
of, say, an isomorphism, is too weak to lend warrant to another of Davidson's key premises -- the idea
that we could never recognize a practice as an untranslatable language. Either way, Glock concludes,
the standard Davidsonian road to the conclusion that CR is unintelligible is not serviceable.
Jane Heal puts the notion of perfect rationality (PR) under the microscope and finds it wanting. She
provides compelling arguments for thinking that its requirements are far too demanding to be
realized, even in principle. Pivotally, she doubts that we can even make sense of there being a
determinate set of a thinker's beliefs and desires from which to get started. She builds from this to
show that the project of making explicit and assessing all of one's presuppositions, required for PR, is
fundamentally misconceived however we might try to cash it out. Indeed, a major part of the problem
is that "There is more in the intentional state of a person than can be captured by some list of
linguistically expressible beliefs or desires" (p. 55). While recognizing the important uses that the
construct of PR has had in philosophy, she challenges its ultimate intelligibility and warns of the
dangers that stem from treating it as a regulative ideal that sets standards toward which we might
aspire. For this risks privileging one kind of human practice -- that associated with a kind of idealized
mathematical form of reasoning -- above all others. In place of this 'picture' she bids us to attend to
the variety of features and activities that we class among the rational. Promoting a more modest,
ecologically grounded notion of rationality, she gets us to focus on the requirements of being an
impressive conversant (requirements that will vary in different contexts and cultures) to good effect.
Genia Schönbaumsfeld touches on a related theme but focuses on the specific case of what grounds
religious language and beliefs. She argues that, according to Wittgenstein, one can only properly
understand and assess religious beliefs from the inside, by becoming familiar with the relevant
practices and coming to understand how its concepts and symbols function in their home context. In
promoting this line, she objects to Nielsen's analysis which, she claims, falsely fosters the idea that we
must choose between either taking religious language to be committed to certain metaphysical claims,
which can be straightforwardly rendered, or treating it as merely expressive in an utterly deflationary
sense -- i.e. as the meaningless outpourings of a specific kind of contentless, non-cognitive way of life.
It is this kind of simple set of options that is precisely what a Wittgensteinian approach to
understanding language precludes across the board. Thus "Wittgenstein isn't denying that people
mean what they say when making religious utterances. Rather he is insisting that we cannot
understand what meaning the utterances come down to unless we understand the use to which the
religious 'pictures' are put" (p. 68). As such, there can be no tenable separation between belief and
practice if we are to understand the point of religious language -- and in this respect such language is
not a special case.
Schönbaumsfeld's paper is a salient reminder that any critique of religious believing must be handled
in a sophisticated way (in line with the maxim that one cannot rationally criticize what one does not
understand). Still, questions remain about how one can adopt truly a religious attitude and beliefs if
the latter has implications that one knows to be improbable. Severin Schroeder explores how this
question arises in a poignant way for Wittgenstein both philosophically and personally. The tension
stems not from the fact that religious thinking is based in metaphysical beliefs that are hard to

sustain, but rather from the fact that even if we accept that such thinking is grounded in a specific
kind of attitude that we can both understand and respect, the beliefs that it gives rise to are simply
too incredible for honest acceptance in the cold, rational light of day. Schroeder works carefully to
show not only how Wittgenstein recognized this incompatibility but also the ways in which he was
regularly tormented by it. In the end, he suggests that it remains unresolved in his philosophy of
religion.
Joachim Schulte turns his hand to the task of illuminating the genealogy of the 'rule following
considerations' in an attempt to recover something of value that is often missing from certain popular
and overly sophisticated readings such as those inspired by, or which seek to respond to, Kripke's
formulation. His analysis reveals the ways in which Wittgenstein's early attempts to distinguish rules
and propositions, and to understand their intimate relation, acted as a spur for his later philosophical
development. Emphasis is placed on the fact that Wittgenstein was not seeking to identify language
use with the playing of games with fixed rules but, rather, his aim was to use more or less welldefined games and calculi as comparative models that shed light on aspects of language use. Schulte
argues that a consequence of adopting this reading is that the rule-following considerations "do not,
or need not, apply to normal ways of using language, since these considerations do concern a calculus,
a game with clearly fixed rules" (p. 115). As a result, echoing Heal, to take this seriously one is pushed
to recognize a much broader and less technical notion of what is reasonable operating in
Wittgenstein's thought -- one that gets is ultimate articulation in On Certainty where -- by Schulte's
lights -- a troubling, somewhat menacing and shifty relativism about what counts as 'reasonable' is
promoted.
Crispin Wright rounds off the set with another entry on the rule-following considerations, but this one
focuses on their connection with Wittgenstein's quietist approach to philosophy. After reminding the
reader of the ontological and epistemological implications of taking seriously the standard picture of
what rule-following demands, quite generally, Wright goes on to show why, for different but well
known reasons, neither of the standard explanatory strategies (i.e. those sponsored by Platonists and
communitarians) can live up to its promises. He accepts that Wittgenstein's finished view on the matter
is that our systematic difficulty in understanding the requirements of rule-following is generated by a
misplaced demand for explanations of a certain form. As a result philosophers systematically fall into
the trap of trying to apply the wrong sort of overly-sophisticated model of what reasoning involves to
what, in the basic cases of interest, is really only a competence through which we 'follow rules blindly
or without reasons' (p. 140). The paper concludes not only by recognizing that this take on rulefollowing 'goes against the grain' but by illustrating this fact with a wonderful discussion of how it
could only be successfully challenged by rehabilitating a notion of experience as 'essentially
conceptually contentful', of the sort promoted by McDowell. Wright is keen only to stress that this is a
forced move for "any philosopher determined to have it that basic judgements are made for reasons
furnished by experience" (p. 143). He demurs from passing a verdict on whether such an account will
ultimately pass muster.
The above digest is brief and only manages to convey a very crude sense of the aims, scope and
content of the various contributions. While some questions can be raised here and there about the
authors' analyses and claims, I found very little to criticize -- all of the papers are of a very high quality.
As is often the case when reviewing edited volumes, it is difficult to do little more than point to some
highlights. I urge the reader to seek out this small but extremely valuable collection to fully evaluate
the nuanced lines of argument it offers.
The delivery of sharply argued, cohesive essays that emerge from conferences held at Reading is a
hallmark of Blackwell's Ratio book series and this volume is no exception to that rule. The tight focus
on varied but connected topics gives this short, crisp collection a strong thematic unity that enables
the reader to find important threads linking its discussions despite the fact that individual chapters
each has its own, quite distinct aims and identity. Still, readers will notice that support for the claims
required by one contribution is often amplified by the fact that those claims (or close variants) are
also required to be true in order to make the best sense of Wittgenstein's thinking in some other
context. For example, the idea that beliefs can only be understood as integrally grounded in certain
practices, activities and ways of life, as opposed to being somehow distinct from these, is a recurrent
theme. At the same time, sometimes interesting and useful challenges are raised about the
interpretations of other contributors (for example, there is an important disagreement between Glock
and Schönbaumsfeld on how to read Davidson). Taken as a whole, this volume provides an extremely

valuable and critically astute examination of utterly fundamental issues that need serious attention
and investigation in today's philosophical climate -- it constitutes a 'must read'.
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